I. General Remarks 1. Evolution of EU Asylum Policy 1
Cooperation on asylum began as a so called flanking measure which compensated states for their loss of control options following the abolition of border controls within the Schengen area (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 1 3) . The Schengen Implementing Convention of 1990 contained a first set of rules on the responsibility for processing applications for asylum. 1 In parallel, all Member States, including those who did not join the Schengen area initially, agreed upon the Dublin Convention of 1990 concerning asylum jurisdiction, 2 which eventually entered into force in September 1997 after a drawn out ratification process. 3 The arrangements pursued a double objective. Firstly, they were meant to prevent 'forum shopping' 4 , a term used to describe situations where asylum seekers leave for countries with generous reception conditions or recognition quota. Secondly, the coordination of asylum jurisdiction was destined to counter the phenomenon of 'refugees in orbit' where applicants are 'referred successively from one Member State to another without any of these States acknowl edging itself to be competent to examine the application' 5 as a result of domestic safe third country rules. In practice, the Dublin Convention did not function particularly well: 95 % of all asylum applications were processed outside the Dublin system in the 1998/1999 period, while actual transfers took place in no more than 1.7 % of cases. 6 2 While the original Schengen and Dublin Conventions moved towards the demarca tion of asylum jurisdiction without a substantive harmonisation of rules on asylum procedure, reception conditions or recognition criteria, the Treaty of Maastricht declared the whole field of asylum policy an area of common interest that was to be realised through intergovernmental decision making. 7 Thus, the EU institutions started coordinating divergent national practices. 8 The Treaty of Amsterdam was a decisive next step, since it first created a supranational competence within the framework of today's TFEU, 9 although fully fledged supranationalisation was achieved only by the Treaty of Lisbon (see Hailbronner/Thym, Constitutional Framework, MN 3 4). In 1999, the European Council in Tampere advanced the idea of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which later found its way into the EU Treaties as a legally binding objective (see below MN 13). A number of legislative acts were adopted to realise the first phase of the CEAS, which remained limited to minimum standards, in line with restrictive EU competences at the time. 10 It focused on vertical policy transfers with the EU legislature emulating practices at national level and spreading them across Europe. 11 Many decisions made at the time have shaped the contours of Europe's asylum policy ever since. 12 and problems of EU asylum policy to this date. 13 
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The move towards a common asylum policy had always been meant to be a gradual one. The Commission proposed, therefore, to replace existing minimum standards by a common set of rules 14 in a second phase of legislative harmonisation that was meant to reduce disparities among Member States both in terms of legislative design and adminis trative practice on the basis of the more robust Treaty base established by the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009. 15 To recast existing legislation the Commission submitted a number of proposals which were adopted after up to four years of occasionally heated debates. 16 Disputes among the EU institutions and problems with practical implementation (see below MN 6) resulted in detailed prescriptions on some questions, which leave little leeway to Member States and which can make it hard to keep an overview of the various facets of Europe's asylum policy acquis. Different It is in the nature of asylum policy that the European Union cannot control many events in countries of origin and transit which have an impact on cross border move ment. This leaves the CEAS with a potentially open flank, since the instruments adopted concentrate on legislative harmonisation among the Member States. Their regulatory leverage can influence events beyond the EU's borders only indirectly. The move towards a continental asylum system entailed that the situation of the external borders became the subject of debate following the death of thousands of migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean, often on boats not fit for travel on the high seas. 18 Later that year, the migratory routes in the Eastern Meditteranean, from Turkey to Greece and, 10 Cf. Article 63(2)(a) EC Treaty, ibid. 11 See Costello, Administrative Governance, p. 313 314; national practices concerned, for instance, the definition of refugee status, accelerated procedures at the border or safe third countries rules. 12 For the underlying policy design, see the Commission Communication, COM (2000) 14 It should be borne in mind that in EU terminology a 'common' policy does not designate the most intensive form of supranational action, i. e. a common policy regularly contains room for a certain degree of diversity among the Member States, see below MN 13. 15 Cf. the Commission Green Paper, COM(2007) 301; and the policy plan on asylum in accordance with the Commission Communication, COM(2008) 360 . 16 For an overview, see Boeles et al., European Migration Law, ch. 6; Peers, EU Justice, ch. 5; and Stern/ Tohidipur, Migration, § 14 paras 63 121. 17 Moreover, legislation on the second phase comprises the new Eurodac Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 (OJ 2013 L 180/1), which is not discussed in this commentary. 18 While the situation between Spain (incl. the Canary Islands) and Northern Africa received much attention in the 2000s, the journey between Libya and Italy or Malta has been a focal point for years, while the so called Eastern route via Turkey and Greece or the Western Balkans gained relevance after 2010.
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Part D I via the Western Balkans, to Central Europe were the focus of attention with almost one million people entering the EU. The response of the EU institutions has been a mix of measures ranging from Frontex operations and the adoption of relation and resettle ment schemes (see below MN 26, 28, 36) to enhanced cooperation with countries of origin or transit, in particular Turkey. 19 Corresponding legal debates concern the extraterritorial scope of human rights and statutory instruments (see Thym 
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EU asylum policy is often criticised for an alleged focus on restrictive measures, trying to prevent migrants from reaching Europe, 20 mirroring the original concept of flanking measures to compensate states for the loss of control over internal borders in a move that critics regularly refer to as 'fortress Europe'. 21 Yet the overall picture is more nuanced. The criticism of entry and border control policies contrasts with a rather generous definition of the criteria for refugee status and subsidiary protection in the Asylum Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU and corresponding procedural rules and reception conditions, which comprise extensive guarantees for vulnerable groups. As a result of the second phase of legislative harmonisation, during which the European Parliament and ECJ judgments played a prominent role, the common legislative standards for interna tional protection are laudable, 22 although generous recognition criteria and reception conditions do respond directly to the continued criticism of the allegedly restrictive entry and border control policies. Notwithstanding practical problems in some Member States (see below MN 6) and the asymmetric distribution of asylum applications within Europe (see below MN 29), the Common European Asylum System was instrumental in estab lishing refugee protection systems in all EU Member States, some of which had not previously contribute substantially to international activities in support of refugees. 23 
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In the field of asylum, the approximation of national laws by the EU institutions does not always result in effective implementation. 24 The most pronounced expression of 19 
Asylum

Part D I
practical deficits is the failure of the Greek asylum system, which both the ECtHR and the ECJ found not to be in compliance with human rights standards and corresponding EU legislation (see below MN 29). It is convincing, therefore, that EU asylum policy has emphasised strengthened practical cooperation in recent years. 25 The establishment of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in Malta seeks more coherence in the interpretation and application of EU legislation on asylum in the same way as the Eurodac database was meant to render the Dublin Regulation more effective. 26 EASO is tasked with sharing information about countries of origin, spreading knowledge about EU asylum law and supporting Member States faced with difficulties, including through emergency support teams. 27 The supranational activities of EASO complement the primary responsibility of national institutions to apply the EU asylum acquis effectively (see below MN 27). Administrative bodies alone, however, cannot achieve the desired convergence of national practices; national and European courts retain the responsi bility to develop coherent standards for specific scenarios (see below MN 46).
Territorial Scope (Member State Participation) 7
Measures on border controls and visas are subject to country specific opt outs for the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. The abstract rules guiding these arrangements are described in the introductory chapter to this commentary (see Hailbronner/Thym, Constitutional Framework, MN 38 45). It was demonstrated that the overall picture is rather complex and can be difficult to discern in specific scenarios, since the country specific opt outs for the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark do not follow a uniform pattern; there are differences between the rules for Denmark on the one hand and for the United Kingdom and Ireland on the other. Moreover, we are faced with two sets of rules for the aforementioned countries: measures building upon the Schengen acquis and other instruments. In practice, the last recitals of most instruments indicate whether the United Kingdom, Ireland and/or Denmark are bound. In order to facilitate orientation, the list of the measures below indicates whether the instruments commen ted upon in this volume are binding for the United Kingdom, Ireland and/or Denmark and whether they are considered to be building upon the Schengen acquis. 
Instrument
II. Treaty Guidance under Article 78 TFEU
Article 78 TFEU 1. The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the princi ple of non refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Conven tion of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures for a common European asylum system comprising: (a) a uniform status of asylum for nationals of third countries, valid throughout the Union; (b) a uniform status of subsidiary protection for nationals of third countries who, without obtaining European asylum, are in need of international protection; (c) a common system of temporary protection for displaced persons in the event of a massive inflow; (d) common procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status; (e) criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum or subsidiary protection; (f) standards concerning the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum or subsidiary protection; (g) partnership and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection. 3. In the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament. As opposed to individual Member States, the European Union is not a state party to the Geneva Convention and, therefore, the EU itself is not bound by it as a matter of public international law; the eventuality of formal accession by the EU to the Convention or other forms of international subordination have not been realised so far (see below MN 47). Against this background, the doctrinal significance of Article 78(1) TFEU stands out: the EU asylum acquis must comply with the Geneva Convention and the 1966 Protocol. Non compliance with the Geneva Convention constitutes an infringe ment of Article 78(1) TFEU that can result in the annulment of secondary legislation or at least require its interpretation in conformity with the Geneva Convention. 35 This position has been reaffirmed in welcome clarity by the ECJ in a number of judgments on today's Asylum Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU. 36 The subordination of the CEAS to the Geneva Convention in Article 78(1) TFEU does not alter its international legal characteristics. As an integral part of EU law, the Geneva Convention continues to be subject to the interpretative principles of public international law (see below MN 49) and Article 78(1) TFEU does not bring about an individual right to asylum transcending the contents of the Geneva Convention, 37 although such an individual guarantee could flow from Article 18 of the EU Charter (see below MN 63).
The obligation to comply with the Geneva Convention contained in the Treaty of Lisbon is not new; Article 63(1) EU Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam and Article K.2(1) EU Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Maastricht contained similar instructions. In contrast to these earlier provisions, Article 78(1) TFEU clarifies, however, that the necessary respect for the Geneva Convention and corresponding human rights guarantees (see below MN 11) applies to all instruments building the EU asylum acquis, including rules on subsidiary and temporary protection (see below MN 19 23). 38 In contrast to those governing refugee protection, however, the rules on subsidiary or temporary protection do not implement established doctrinal categories of international law. 39 This entails that the EU legislature retains discretion to define or alter the contours of the EU's subsidiary and temporary protection regimes as long as corresponding rules comply with international refugee and human rights law (see below MN 19 23).
Compliance with the Geneva Convention is a matter of course from a political perspective. Doctrinally, however, Article 78(1) TFEU sets out a constitutive obligation, since multilateral conventions to which the EU has not formally acceded can only be relied on within the EU legal order if they have been ratified by all EU Member States and are directly applicable (see Hailbronner/Thym, Constitutional Framework, MN 54 57). To require EU legislation to comply with the Convention ensures compliance in all circumstances and prevents diverging obligations from being imposed on Member States by EU law and the Geneva Convention. Such discrepancies would have to be 35 As a shared competence, legislation on asylum must comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality that oblige the EU legislature to limit their action to initiatives that cannot be sufficiently achieved at national level and remain limited, in terms of regulatory intensity, to what is necessary to achieve legitimate policy objectives. 46 However, when assessing specific proposals, it should be acknowledged that the far reaching Treaty objective of a Common European Asylum System (see below MN 13) requires a certain amount of generosity in the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in support of EU action. 47 The term 'measure' in the introductory part 40 The Treaty of Lisbon attributes the rank of primary law to the objective of establish ing a Common European Asylum System (French: système européen commun d'asile; German: gemeinsames europäisches Asylsystem), 48 which was first introduced by the European Council in Tampere and was later taken up by the Commission. 49 The objective generally calls for more commonality and can influence both the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (see above MN 12) and the interpretation of secondary legislation, in relation to which it supports a restrictive reading of vaguely formulated provisions on more favourable national treatment (see Hailbronner/Thym, Constitutional Framework, MN 28 33). It also resonates with the ECJ's position that horizontal cooperation among Member States, for instance under the Dublin system, 50 is governed by the principle of mutual trust (see below MN 29). In cases of doubt, the Treaty objective of the Common European Asylum System argues for more harmonisation, although the EU institutions retain as in the case of other Treaty objectives a principled discretion regarding the necessity and course of EU action. Moreover, the concept of a Common European Asylum System does not command quasi federal uniformity, since the adjective 'common' (French: commun; German: gemeinsam) is usually employed, in the EU context at least, to designate an intermediate degree of harmonisation, in contrast to the designation of a 'single' (French: unique; German: einheitlich) policy. 51 The common policy on asylum trans cends the minimum measures foreseen by the Treaty of Amsterdam (see above MN 2), but stays short of quasi federal uniformity. 
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Part D I change should not be construed, however, as a permission for a distinct status for asylum under EU law that does not coincide with refugee status under the Geneva Convention. Both the drafting history and the general scheme of the EU Treaties argue in support of substantive congruence of the EU asylum status and refugee status; the move towards the Common European Asylum System was always meant to be founded upon the Convention. 54 This is confirmed by the explicit references to the Convention in both Article 78(1) TFEU and Article 18 of the EU Charter. 55 Legislation on the basis of Article 78(2)(a) TFEU is thus bound to specify the meaning of the Geneva Conven tion and secondary legislation must be interpreted in light of the latter (see above MN 8). Indeed, the Asylum Qualification Directive is meant to 'guide the competent national bodies of Member States in the application of the Geneva Convention.' 56 Distinct national protection schemes, such as the autonomous concept of asylum under the German Constitution, can be applied in parallel under the condition that they cannot be confused with the EU asylum status. 57
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Besides the criteria governing refugee status, Article 78(2)(a) TFEU allows for the harmonisation of a bundle of rights after recognition, in line with the international practice on the juridical status of refugees under the Geneva Convention. 58 The content of international protection under Articles 20 35 Asylum Qualification Directive 2011/ 95/EU is therefore based on Article 78(2)(a) TFEU, 59 while reception conditions for those whose application is still being considered are covered by Part F as lex specialis (see below MN 31). Other legal bases must be distinguished, in line with settled ECJ case law, on the basis of the contents and objectives of the instrument in question. Permanent residence status for refugees is thus covered by Article 79(2)(a) TFEU in the same way as reunification with family members not applying for protection for themselves, 60 while the transnational coordination of social security schemes continues to be covered by Article 48 TFEU as lex specialis. 61 In contrast to Union citizens, refugees and other third country nationals do not benefit from an individual right to free movement within the single market; it remains the decision of the legislature to decide whether and, if so, under which conditions free movement within the EU shall be allowed (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 28 36). Along similar lines, the option of a uniform asylum status 'valid throughout the Union' in Article 78(2)(a) TFEU indicates that the condi tions for mobility within Europe are to be determined in the ordinary legislative procedure. 62 At present, refugees benefit from intra European mobility once they have obtained permanent residence status or qualify for residence in accordance with national 55 Article 18 of the EU Charter designates a 'right to asylum' whose substance and contents is to be defined, according to the EU Charter, by the Geneva Convention. 56 62 The legislature may opt, for instance, to make free movement conditional upon economic self sufficiency, language skills and/or a job offer in compliance with domestic labour market tests.
Asylum
Part D I immigration laws. 63 Calls for more favourable free movement rights are political in nature and do not reflect a legal obligation on the EU legislature under Article 78 TFEU. This conclusion is reaffirmed, moreover, by the terminological openness of Arti cle 78(2)(a) TFEU in relation to the uniform asylum status 'valid throughout the Union', whose transnational validity can alternatively be interpreted as a reference to the mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions as a result of which Member States would be allowed, in cases of secondary movements, to return asylum seekers to the Member State that had issued the recognition. 64 It is beyond doubt, given its unequivocal wording, that the personal scope of Article 78(2)(a) TFEU relates to third country nationals, including stateless persons (Article 67(2) TFEU). 65 The EU therefore has no competence for intra European asylum claims. This exclusion for asylum applications by Union citizens reflects the character of the European Union as a community founded upon the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights. 66 In line with Protocol (No 24) on Asylum for Nationals of Member States of the European Union the Member States 'shall be regarded as constituting safe countries of origin in respect of each other for all legal and practical purposes in relation to asylum matters.' 67 This designation of all Member States as safe countries of origin has the rank of primary law in accordance with Article 51 TEU and benefits from supremacy over conflicting national legislation. 68 As a result, applications in accordance with national legislation can be processed only in compliance with the criteria set out in Protocol (No 24), which focus on an abstract assessment of the situation in the country concerned 'on the basis of the presumption that [the application] is manifestly unfounded.' 69 b) Subsidiary Protection. Rules in the Geneva Convention are based on experience of state sponsored persecution on the European continent in the first half of the 20 th century, while today's mixed migration flows are often characterised by convolution. In practice, many asylum seekers are fleeing indiscriminate violence, in particular civil wars or resort to the asylum system for economic reasons. Moreover, we are witnessing a growing complexity of push factors that are not always covered by the Geneva Convention. 70 The EU Treaties react to this challenge, in line with earlier national practices, 71 by providing for 'a uniform status of subsidiary protection for nationals of third countries who, without obtaining European asylum, are in need of international 
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Part D I protection' (Article 78(2)(b) TFEU). 72 Like in the case of refugee status, the reference to a 'uniform status of subsidiary protection' allows for the adoption of recognition criteria and a bundle of rights after recognition, including the option (not: obligation) of mobility rights within the European Union (see above MN 16 17). On the other hand, the adjective 'uniform' (French: uniforme; German: einheitlich) implies an enhanced degree of harmonisation (see above MN 14). Distinct legal bases for refugee status (part A) and subsidiary protection (part B) indicate that the legislature is not obliged to treat refugees and those with subsidiary protection equally. 73 It remains the prerogative of the EU legislature to define the contours of the subsidiary protection status, including grounds for recognition, since the concept of subsidiary protection does not correspond, in contrast to refugee status, to a clearly defined concept under international law (see above MN 15). Nor is the EU legislature obliged, under EU primary law, to limit itself to the criteria enshrined in the present Article 15 Asylum Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU. 74 The criteria for subsidiary protection could thus be altered or amended in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure in response to practical demands and/or political priorities. 75 It could also be decided to replace the individual right to subsidiary protection by quantitative protection quotas whose exhaustion would prevent successful applications. Outer limits to legislative discretion can be deduced from the underlying idea of 'international protection' which designates factors with a cross border dimension and relates, in particular, to the situation in countries of origin or transit. 76 Article 78(2)(b) TFEU concerns scenarios of forced migration, while 'voluntary' migration, in particular for economic purposes, is covered by Article 79 TFEU (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 13). 77 In the delineation of corresponding instruments, the legislature benefits from a certain discretion on the basis of which it could modify, to a certain extent at least, the 'rationale of international protection' identified by the ECJ to exclude residence 'on compassionate or humanitarian grounds' in reaction to general shortcomings in the economic and social system of a home state, since Directive 2011/ 95/EU requires persecution by an actor in line with the Geneva Convention. 78 72 Article 63(2)(a) EC Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam (OJ 1997 C 340/173) had remained ambiguous in this respect, since it was unclear whether the reference to persons who 'otherwise' (i. e. in addition to temporary protection) need international protection was a sufficient basis for a distinct subsidiary protection regime; see Hailbronner, Immigration and Asylum, p. 81. 73 
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It is possible to base the criteria for subsidiary protection on non refoulement obligations under international human rights law which can reach further than refugee protection under the Geneva Convention (see below MN 55 61), although the EU legislature is not obliged to do so. 79 When similar terminology is used, it has to be ascertained, by means of interpretation, whether statutory provisions of EU secondary law are to be interpreted in line with international human rights law. In the case of the Asylum Qualification Directive, the ECJ decided that this was not the case (see Storey, Directive 2011/95/EU, Article 15 MN 12 14). This autonomy of subsidiary protection under EU law has a twofold implication: it indicates, firstly, that EU legislation can provide for international protection in situations below the threshold of human rights obligation. Secondly, the opposite scenario could also arise, in theory at least, 80 if EU legislation does not extend the concept of subsidiary protection to situations covered by human rights law. Mandatory respect for human rights can be ensured, in the second scenario, on the basis of humanitarian protection rules in domestic immigra tion and asylum laws beyond the confines of EU legislation. 81 22 c) Temporary Protection. During the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, many Member States were confronted with a 'massive inflow' of people seeking protection. At the time, the idea became popular to establish specific rules for such scenarios, which would allow states to act on the basis of abstract criteria without necessarily analysing, in contrast to asylum applications, the need for international protection on an indivi dual basis. 82 The objective of reacting swiftly to situations of massive inflows resulted in the adoption of the Temporary Protection Directive 2001/55/EC, which was the first legally binding instrument ever to be agreed upon by the EU institutions in the field of asylum, and explains why Article 78(2)(c) TFEU provides for an express legal basis for temporary protection. In practice, the Temporary Protection Directive has not been activated so far despite various instances in which this could have been done. The idea to react to scenarios of massive inflows with specific instruments has lost its relevance (see Skordas, Directive 2001/55/EC Article 1 MN 15).
Given that temporary protection does not build on a pre existing concept under international law (see above MN 15, 20), the EU legislature has wide discretion when defining the contours of temporary protection. As an integral part of the Common European Asylum System, rules on temporary protection can potentially be applied to various forms of forced migration (see above MN 20), while temporary residence permits for economic purposes, such as those for seasonal workers, are covered by Article 79 TFEU (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 12 13). In a similar vein, the term 'displaced persons' in Article 78(2)(c) TFEU indicates that the provision concerns cross border movements of people in reacting to various forms of hazards in countries of origin, such as civil wars or natural disasters. EU legislation could potentially embrace all these scenarios. 
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Article 78(2)(d) TFEU covers provisions on various aspects of the asylum procedure, such as the personal interview, the evaluation by administrative authorities or special rules for vulnerable persons together with guarantees for judicial protection that can be found in the Asylum Procedures Directive 2013/32/EU. In cases of conflict, EU legislation and national administrative practices have to be interpreted in light of the procedural guarantees in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (see Hailbronner/Thym, Constitutional Framework, MN 37). Article 78(2)(d) TFEU covers both applications for asylum and subsidiary protection without necessarily requiring the EU legislature to lay down identical standards for both categories; the term 'common' refers to the approx imation of differences among the Member States, 85 not the equal treatment of asylum and subsidiary protection. Article 78(2)(d) TFEU also covers statutory provisions on safe countries of origin or transit, 86 which exist in various Member States and are subject to the caveats laid down in the Asylum Procedure Directive (see Vedsted Hansen, Directive 2013/32/EU Articles 36 38). 87 The EU Treaty is silent on the geographical scope of the provision on asylum procedures and does not specify, in particular, whether common 'procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status' should necessarily apply within the territory of the Member States. This textual ambivalence contrasts with restrictive earlier formulations 88 MN 52 54, 60) . 94 The EU institutions cannot bypass these constitutional guarantees by relocating beyond the EU's borders.
In 94 It would have to be assessed carefully whether the Member States and/or the EU hold jurisdiction in asylum processing centres, without which the ECHR cannot be applied extraterritorially (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 38 39), while corresponding jurisdictional standards under the EU Charter remain unclear at this juncture (see ibid., MN 41). 95 Article 78(2)(d) TFEU presumes the existence of national asylum systems, for which 'common' standards are to be established, in the same way as Article 78(2)(e) TFEU assumes that a specific Member State shall be responsible for considering an application for international protection. 
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Part D I mécanismes; German: Verfahren). 97 It is the prerogative of the legislature to decide upon relevant criteria in the legislative procedure; the legislature can modify existing rules or opt for an alternative mechanism, such as a quota system allocating asylum seekers among Member States on the basis of a redistribution key set out in EU legislation. 98 The open terms 'criteria' and 'mechanisms', which define the EU competence under Article 78(2)(e) TFEU, are not confined to the former or present Dublin Regulations. New or additional distribution or relocation mechanisms can be introduced in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure 99 or established by means of agree ments among representatives of the Member States. 100 However, the Treaty covers asylum seekers only and does not establish a competence for the relocation of recognised refugees. In order to support the application of EU legislation (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 10), 101 Article 78(2)(e) TFEU also covers instruments rendering the Dublin Regulation more effective, such as the Eurodac database of finger prints and other data. 102 It is well known that the former and present Dublin Regulations have resulted in a considerable asymmetry in the number of asylum applications across Europe. In this respect, Article 80 TFEU lays down a general obligation to support Member States that assume more responsibilities than others for the functioning of the Common European Asylum System. This obligation can be implemented in various ways, including by means of financial and/or operative support, and does not necessarily require a recast of the Dublin III Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (see below MN 43 44). Moreover, human rights can oblige Member States not to transfer asylum seekers to another Member State in exceptional scenarios whenever there are systemic flaws in the asylum proce dure and in the reception conditions (see below MN 58). The ECJ has emphasised, in this context, that the principle of mutual trust mandates a careful assessment in order not to jeopardise the functioning of the CEAS, while the ECtHR seems to insist on stricter standards. In cases of conflict, the ECJ is the ultimate authority on the interpretation of the EU asylum acquis (see below MN 56).
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland (and Liechtenstein), which participate in the Schengen area on the basis of public international law (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 29), have concluded international agreements with the European Union providing for their participation in the Dublin system on the basis of a dynamic institutional framework covering amendments to or recasts of previous legislation, such as the new Dublin III Regulation (EU) No 604/2013. 103 Moreover, 97 In contrast to Article 63(1)(a) EC Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam (OJ 1997 C 340/ 173), Article 78(2)(e) TFEU applies to both asylum and subsidiary protection. 98 Germany's quota system and its potential implications for the EU, see Thym/Beverungen/Gies, Germany's Domestic "Königstein Quota System" and EU Asylum Policy, Verfassungsblog.de on 11 Oc tober 2013. 99 It is compatible with primary law to establish parallel mechanisms such as the partial quota for intra European relocation and/or voluntary resettlement schemes in parallel to the Dublin III Regulation suggested by the Commission Proposal, COM (2015) 450. 100 Legally speaking, agreements of Member States do not constitute secondary EU law, even if they are adopted by national representatives 'meeting within the Council'; such practice was common in the 1960s and 1970s and they were reactivated for the first relocation and resettlement schemes adopted in July 2015 according to Council doc 11097/15 for intergovernmental quotas accompanying Council Decision 2015/1523 (OJ 2015 L 239/143) and Council doc 11130/15; as a result, the ECJ would not be competent for interpretation and the EU Charter would not apply. 101 Similarly, see Weiß, Article 78 TFEU, para 38. The reference in Article 78(2)(f) TFEU to 'standards' (French: normes; German: Normen) should not be interpreted strictly as covering rules on legislative harmonisa tion only. Rather, the provision should be interpreted in the light of Article 80 TFEU on solidarity, which does not in itself provide a legal basis for support instruments but can influence the interpretation of other Treaty provisions (see below MN 43). This implies that Article 78(2)(f) TFEU covers financial or operative support, including through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund that supports projects concerning the accom modation of asylum seekers. 106 g) Cooperation with Third States. Although asylum has, by definition, a cross border dimension, most national asylum systems and international refugee law until recently focused on the situation after asylum seekers had reached the state territory. The Europeanisation of asylum policy encourages a gradual paradigm change if states on the European continent collaborate in order to ensure the effective application of the Geneva Convention (see above MN 5), thereby mirroring a general thrust of EU migration policy to support enhanced international cooperation. 107 The European Council has repeatedly called upon the EU institutions to extend international colla boration beyond Europe and to support a global approach. 108 Although Article 78(2)(g) TFEU constitutes an integral part of the Common Eur opean Asylum System and refers to cooperation with third states 'for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protec tion,' 111 the provision should not be confined to movements with an immediate impact on the functioning of the CEAS, since the factors defining migration flows are inherently blurred. 112 Moreover, a broad reading supports the effective realisation of other EU policies, including on external action and development cooperation. 113 Other legal bases must be distinguished, in line with settled ECJ case law, on the basis of the content and objective of the instrument in question; if the latter concerns primarily the functioning of the CEAS, Article 78(2)(g) TFEU should be used, while other instru ments can be based on other policies, such as the instruments for financial support in the context of development and neighbourhood policies. 114 Corollary rules on asylum in association and neighbourhood agreements are covered by these legal bases, while Article 78(2)(g) TFEU applies to sectoral treaties (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 15).
Support for third states in the field of asylum can help establish a favourable political and practical context for the realisation of the controversial proposal to establish asylum reception centres in North Africa. 115 Article 78(2)(g) TFEU does not, in itself at least, provide a sufficient legal basis for the initiation of such centres, since coopera tion with third states on the basis of this provision must be distinguished from protection by national personnel with EU support abroad. It has been explained above, however, that the Treaty of Lisbon deliberately discontinued the previous limitation of the Common European Asylum System to the territory of the Member States. 
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have to be run by the Member States, possibly in cooperation with EASO (see above MN 26 27). In order to render such external processing centres effective, Artic le 78(2)(g) TFEU could be activated to guarantee a favourable political and adminis trative context, for instance through support to third states to apply their international legal obligations effectively.
Emergency Situations (Article 78(3) TFEU)
Legislation on temporary protection in the event of a massive inflow is covered by Article 78(2)(c) TFEU and need not be confined to the statutory status quo under the present Temporary Protection Directive 2011/55/EC (see above MN 22 23). By con trast, Article 78(3) TFEU concerns, in line with the previous Article 64(2) EC Treaty, 116 other measures for the benefit of certain Member States in emergency situations, although this support must be confined, according to the wording, to 'provisional measures.' It corresponds to the desire of swift decision making in emergency situations that the Council decides by qualified majority after consulting the European Parlia ment. 117 When deciding the time period during which provisional measures should apply, the EU institutions benefit from a certain discretion, 118 which also extends to the definition of what constitutes an 'emergency situation' justifying recourse to Article 78(3) TFEU. 119 Similarly, the institutions have a margin of appreciation when deciding upon the substance of support measures. 120 They may, in particular, include financial or operative support, among others by EASO, the activation of which does not necessarily require recourse to Article 78(3) TFEU (see above MN 27, 32). By contrast, any permanent amendment of secondary legislation outside the confines of the ordinary legislative procedure cannot be decided on the basis of Article 78(3) TFEU; 121 neither can visa requirements be imposed on that basis. 122 This conclusion rests on the rather vague language that does not contain any clear indication that 'provisional measures' can justify non compliance with secondary EU legislation. However, it appears possible to lay down leges speciales which apply for a temporary period like in the case of the relocation schemes established in 2015 which implied a temporary derogation from the Dublin III Regulation. 123 
III. Overarching Principles 1. Mixed Migration Flows and Legal Status Change 37
It is explained elsewhere that rules on immigration and asylum in the EU Treaties do not conceive cross border movements of people as simple one step settlements that instantly result in either full membership or illegal residence. Instead, the careful 116 Article 64(2) EC Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam (OJ 1997 C 340/173). 117 Given the absence of any indication to the contrary, qualified majority voting in the Council applies in accordance with Article 16(3) TEU. 118 The Treaty of Lisbon discontinued the previous limitation to a six month period; the 24 month period of the EU relocation scheme mentioned below arguably stretches the discretion to its limits.
119 COM (2015) 286, p. 2 3 had extensive recourse to statistical data to justify the proposal of a relocation scheme, which need not be done in all scenarios; political institutions have to assess the situation politically and need not embark upon a quasi academic justification. 120 
Legal Framework for EU Asylum Policy
Part D I distinction of different statuses in the wording of the EU Treaties implies that the legal dimension of regular migrants' biographies can be described as a process of legal status change with distinct sets of rules applying in different scenarios (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 7). This conclusion extends to the varying facets of the existing EU asylum acquis. In accordance with secondary law, asylum seekers entering Europe may encounter 'mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible' (Article 78(2)(e) TFEU) and are accommodated under harmonised reception conditions (Article 78(2)(f) TFEU). Their asylum application will be decided on the basis of common procedures (Article 78(2)(d) TFEU) and single recognition criteria (Article 78(2)(a), (b) TFEU) . The decision on the application for asylum will not usually be the end of the migrants' encounter with EU immigration and asylum law. Depending on the circumstances of the individual case, each migrant will continue being confronted with different scenarios.
38
Following a positive asylum decision, migrants in need of international protection obtain the right to stay in the Member State that took the decision. The option of an asylum status valid throughout the Union does not necessarily entail that free move ment across Member States should be granted from day one, since the legislature remains free to choose among different options of a pan European status (see above MN 17). De lege lata, statutory free movement for recognised refugees is guaranteed after five years of legal residence under the conditions laid down in the Long Term Residents Directive (see Thym, Directive 2003/109/EC Article 3 MN 6). Moreover, those in need of international protection can qualify for unconditional free movement after naturalisation in a Member States as a result of which rules for Union citizens apply. 124 Existing directives on legal migration for other purposes usually exclude asylum seekers and recognised refugees ratione personae. 125 However, Member States can allow access to their territory to refugees living in another Member State in accordance with more favourable national rules adopted beyond the confines of the said EU directives on legal migration. 126 The EU legislature remains free, moreover, to amend legislation and to extend, for instance, existing rules under the Blue Card Directive to those in need of international protection.
After an asylum application has been rejected, the directives on asylum no longer apply. Article 9(1) Asylum Procedure Directive 2013/32/EU explicitly states that the right to remain in the Member States pending the examination of the application exists 'for the sole purpose of the procedure until to the determining authority has made a decision' and that '[t]hat right to remain shall not constitute an entitlement to a residence permit.' This implies that unsuccessful asylum seekers must usually be qualified as people who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, stay or residence in the Member States, i. 
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Part D I accordance with human rights law and statutory requirements set out at national and European level, including the Return Directive 2008/115/EC. In practice, Member States do not return all those who could be returned in accordance with Union law and instead often grant various degrees of complementary protection for humanitarian or other purposes, either on the occasion of a rejection of an asylum application or at a later stage. 128 These various forms of complementary protection remain intact besides EU legislation (see above MN 20). Moreover, many Member States regularly pursue regularisation campaigns by granting residence permits to illegal residents in accor dance with national laws which have not so far been harmonised by the EU (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 13).
40
The prevalence of so called 'mixed flows' designates the underlying reason for the ambivalence of asylum law after the recognition or rejection of the initial application. People applying for asylum leave their home countries for various reasons that cannot always be considered an expression of 'forced migration.' 129 This entails that political reactions to the pertinence of mixed migration flows often embrace a multi pronged approach as the Commission's 'Agenda on Migration' in response to the recent refugee crisis (see above MN 5) illustrates: it included various policy initiatives and tried to combine different instruments ranging from enhanced protection for those in need to reinforced return policies. 130 Generally speaking, political responses to mixed flows will often include, on the one hand, measures for people in need of international protection, such as resettlement, the fight against the root causes of involuntary movements or protection in countries of origin or transit. On the other hand, instruments focusing on the prevention of illegal entry and more effective procedures for the identification of people (not) in need of protection, such as safe country of origin or transit concepts, will often be considered together with initiatives rendering return policies more effective.
Solidarity (Article 80 TFEU)
Article 80 TFEU The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.
41
Calls for more solidarity and a fair sharing of responsibilities have accompanied the Europeanisation of asylum policy from the beginning. In the 1990s, Germany was unsuccessful with its demand to complement the Dublin Convention with a quota system on the relocation of asylum seekers among Member States. 131 During the 2000s and 2010s, the states at the external Schengen borders in Southern and South Eastern Europe complained about the conceptual asymmetry of the Dublin system that allocates 128 For a comparative survey, see Schieber, Komplementärer Schutz, ch 3. 
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Part D I more responsibilities to the states of first entry (even if some Central and Northern European countries, such as Sweden, Belgium, Austria and Germany, account for the majority of applications in practice, also because many of those who are registered first in Italy or Greece more on to Northern Europe). 132 Against this background, the European Convention drafting the erstwhile Constitutional Treaty agreed upon a specific Treaty provision on solidarity, 133 and the European Council appealed for more solidarity before the formal entry into force of the provision, 134 thereby influencing the adoption of numerous policy initiatives concerning various forms of financial, logistical and operative support (see below MN 44).
In a European Union aspiring to be some sort of political union, solidarity among its federated states should be considered a means to its own end in order to ensure a sustainable basis for the European integration process. Similar attempts to reinforce solidarity within the EU were established, in parallel to Article 80 TFEU, with regard to other policy areas, such as economic policy, energy and in relation to potential terrorist attacks or natural disasters. 135 At the same time, political science shows that solidarity can be an important precondition for effective cooperation among states to the benefit of a better asylum policy implemented in practice (see above MN 6). Thus, the willingness to participate in the construction of the CEAS is enhanced by mechanisms embedding inter state cooperation in a framework promoting mutual trust in the common interest. 136 Such convergence can be pursued through a give and take ap proach in various policy areas or within the domain of migration and asylum policy sensu stricto. The same applies to attempts to foster cooperation with third states in the field of asylum (see above MN 33 35).
In contrast to an earlier Treaty provision, 137 Article 80 TFEU establishes no free standing competence for the adoption of measures promoting solidarity and respon sibility sharing among Member States. 138 Rather, other 'Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter' shall contain instruments putting Article 80 TFEU into effect, which as a result must be legally construed as a horizontal provision that may influence the interpretation of other Treaty competences on border controls, asylum and immigra tion. 139 This means, more specifically, that the interpretation of Articles 77 79 TFEU in light of the general scheme of the EU Treaties, including Article 80 TFEU, may allow for the promotion of solidarity and burden sharing among Member States. The level of generality in the wording of Article 80 TFEU and the necessary combination with other Treaty provisions entail that the EU institutions have broad political discretion in deciding which measures are 'appropriate' to promote solidarity and responsibility sharing. 140 There is, in regular circumstances at least, no precise judiciable standards obliging the EU institutions to opt for a specific solution, although they are bound by the abstract legal obligation to promote solidarity and burden sharing in the realisation of the area of freedom, security and justice.
In practice, EU institutions may opt for and have established various forms of financial, logistical, operative or legislative support. While some of these instruments concern general questions, since they are meant, for instance, to enhance the ability of the Member States to apply the EU asylum acquis effectively (e. g. training tools for judges and civil servants established by EASO), others relate to specific scenarios of support for one or several Member States with difficulties (e. g. Rapid Border Interven tion Teams in the context of FRONTEX). Legislative support may include, by way of example, a relocation scheme for asylum seekers (see above MN 28, 36) or the introduction of visa requirements when one or several Member States are faced with an increase of illegal entries from certain third state (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 10). Finally, the wording of Article 80 TFEU emphasises that the EU institutions can have recourse to financial assistance in order to enhance solidarity within the CEAS, and a considerable amount of money is distributed among Member States by the Commission for external border controls and visas as well as asylum, migration and integration purposes. 141
IV. International Law and Human Rights 45
EU immigration and asylum law is firmly embedded in the constitutional framework of the EU Treaties, including human rights. From a doctrinal perspective, the rights and principles enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights serve as the primary yardstick for the judicial review of EU legislation, both in situations where its validity is at stake or where it is interpreted in conformity with human rights. While the EU institutions must respect the Charter in all their activities, the Member States are bound only when implementing Union law (see Hailbronner/Thym, Constitutional Frame work, MN 47 48). In specific scenarios, the interpretation of the EU Charter by the ECJ typically follows the case law of the ECtHR on the ECHR, although the ECJ is not formally obliged to follow the Strasbourg court (see ibid., MN 51). In contrast to international human rights law and the Geneva Convention, international agreements of the Member States to which the EU has not formally acceded do not form part of the EU legal order as a matter of principle (see ibid., MN 58 59). On the basis of these general principles, this section concentrates on the human rights dimension of EU instruments on asylum discussed in this chapter.
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In practice, the adjudication of international legal standards in the field of asylum, both under the Geneva Convention and international human rights law, regularly concerns not only abstract legal principles but also the assessment of the factual situation in diverse countries of origin or transit. If we want the rules building the CEAS to be applied coherently across the EU (see above MN 6), uniform standards across Europe should be strived for. Unfortunately, however, there seems to exist a structural deficit of the European court architecture in asylum matters. Firstly, the ECJ is bound to limit itself, in the preliminary reference procedure at least, to questions of abstract legal interpretation and does not regularly evaluate the situation in specific 
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Part D I countries of origin or transit. 142 Secondly, the ECtHR can also consider the facts, but does so only after the exhaustion of local remedies, 143 and is limited, moreover, to the interpretation of the ECHR which cannot automatically be extended to statutory EU rules on asylum (see above MN 21). Thirdly, while national authorities may share information on countries of origin with the active support of EASO, this cannot bind the judges who are independent. This implies that national courts of last instance retain a principled responsibility to apply the EU asylum acquis coherently to specific scenarios, among others by means of horizontal cross fertilisation by taking note of the position of other national courts. 144 
Geneva Convention 47
The Geneva Convention, together with the 1967 Protocol, constitutes the centrepiece of international refugee law and serves as a central point of reference for the EU asylum acquis. That being said, it should be noted that the European Union has not unlike the Member States formally acceded to the Geneva Convention. EU primary law may encompass an (exclusive) external Union competence for most matters covered by the Convention today, 145 but the Geneva Convention to this date does not allow for the accession of the EU. 146 The option of a unilateral declaration by the EU to commit itself formally on the international plane to adhere to the Geneva Convention has not so far been realised; 147 neither has the EU assumed the responsibilities of the Member States as state parties by way of functional succession, following the earlier example of the GATT. 148 This implies that as a matter of public international law the EU is bound, in line with settled ECJ case law, only by those provisions of the Geneva Convention that correspond to obligations under customary international law (see Hailbronner/Thym, Constitutional Framework, MN 58). Although the EU has not acceded to the Geneva Convention, Member States are under an obligation to represent the EU's position in treaty bodies. 149 What is more, the EU could adopt formal decisions under Arti cle 218(9) TFEU determining the position of the Member States in international treaty bodies or the UNHCR Executive Committee. 150 Notwithstanding the absence of an international obligation to abide by the Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol, the EU has committed itself unequivocally in Article 78(1) TFEU to respect its provisions as a matter of Union law when establishing the Common European Asylum System (see above MN 8). This internal commitment prevents a mismatch between the obligations of the Member States under supranational Union law and public international law, since the ECJ is bound to respect the Geneva Convention in the interpretation of the EU asylum acquis (see above MN 10). Given that the EU has not signed up the Geneva Convention under public international law, the ECJ has no comprehensive jurisdiction to interpret the Geneva Convention in situations not pertaining directly to rules in EU legislation, including in situations of Member State discretion. 151 In such (rare) scenarios, national courts remain free to interpret the Geneva Convention autonomously without a preliminary reference to the ECJ, and the legal effects of the Geneva Convention will follow the rules of the domestic law order in question.
Like in the case of other international agreements, the ECJ and national courts should recognise that the Geneva Convention must be interpreted in line with the established principles of public international law as reaffirmed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (see Hailbronner/Thym, Constitutional Framework, MN 57). Distinct principles for the interpretation of Union law (see ibid., MN 10 27) do not extend to the Geneva Convention. This implies that, in accordance with Article 31(3) Vienna Convention, state practice constitutes one point of reference for the interpretation of the Geneva Convention, together with other interpretative principles such as the effective achievement of the Convention's purposes. 152 The same applies to the position of the UNHCR, in particular its handbooks and commentaries (see below MN 53), although they cannot be qualified as being legally binding in themselves, since UNHCR does not hold the power to interpret the Geneva Convention authoritatively. 153 In the absence of an institution that may provide for the authoritative interpretation of the Geneva Convention as a matter of international law, academic contributions should discuss the suitability of different interpretative standards and the legitimacy of diver ging positions openly instead of assuming single handedly that there is only one convincing interpretation available.
For the interpretation of the Geneva Convention, a transnational dialogue among courts can be an important instrument, both within and beyond the European Union. 154 The ECJ plays a central role in this respect, since its position on the interpretation of the Geneva Convention has obtained great visibility across the world in recent years, 155 150 Cf ECJ, Germany vs. Council, C 399/12, EU:C:2014:2258, paras 48 68; the situation applies to any international organisation, treaty body or other forum dealing with areas covered by exclusive external EU competences, also with regard to decisions that are, like in the case cited, not legally binding. 151 
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Part D I thereby complementing the existing dialogue among courts from Commonwealth countries and the US, which had dominated transnational debates until recently. This newly found prominence of ECJ judgments on the Geneva Convention does not mean that national courts have no role to play. On the contrary, the abstract character of many ECJ judgments and the significance of country specific assessments (see above MN 46) implies that the position of domestic courts which unlike the ECJ often have a specialisation in asylum law, can be an important factor for the interpretation of the Geneva Convention. 156 National courts should actively reflect the position of their peers in other Member States, thereby enhancing the coherence of the CEAS and contributing to the transnational visibility of the European position on the interpreta tion of the Geneva Convention.
Many provisions in the Geneva Convention contain vaguely formulated rules or expressly provide for discretion on the side of the contracting parties. In such scenarios, abstract obligations under the Geneva Convention can be complemented with more detailed statutory rules in EU legislation, such as the Asylum Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU (see above MN 15). In this respect, EU legislation contributes to a pan European understanding of the Geneva Convention which is binding on the Member States as a matter of Union law and which may, particularly through ECJ judgments, have an impact on judicial practices worldwide (see above MN 50). It is discussed elsewhere whether and, if so, to what extent the Geneva Convention embraces, from today's perspective, an individual right of asylum seekers not to be rejected at the border (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 40) and commands for extraterritorial effects, in particular with regard to border controls on the high seas (see Thym, ibid. 36).
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The Geneva Convention does not contain rules on procedures. Nonetheless, general principles on a fair asylum procedure have been developed in the application of the Convention. They require state parties, in line with the principle of good faith, 157 to institute 'fair and effective' procedures in order to determine who is entitled to the guarantees of the Convention. 158 This position has found general acceptance, in particular with regard to the principle of non refoulement, but it can be difficult to determine the precise scope of corresponding obligations at the international level in specific scenarios (see below MN 54). State practice, including court judgments, are the main source to determine whether such general principles have evolved, 159 although other interpretative standards must also be considered (see above MN 49). Moreover, many international and non governmental agencies have in recent years formulated general principles on asylum procedures, which often make an effort to promote the progressive evolution of the law.
Prominent among them is the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status of 1979 and a series of Executive Committee Recommen dations on the determination of refugee status, including problems arising from manifestly unfounded or abusive applications. 160 In 2002, the International Law Association passed a declaration on international minimum standards based on a report by its Committee on Refugee Procedures, which distinguishes between general procedural standards, rules for the hearing and the determination of claims as well as standards on appeals and reviews in situations of a real risk of persecution or harm. 161 It should be noted that none of these recommendations, resolutions, conclusions or decisions constitutes an authoritative source of interpretation (see above MN 49). Their non binding character frequently follows from the title or wording, the lack of a competence of the respective body to adopt binding rules or the circumstances of their elaboration. The House of Lords explicitly noted, in a judgment of 2003, that the opinion of non governmental or international bodies or a consensus of the academic literature cannot constitute customary international law unless it was accepted by the states as binding under international law. 162 
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In the application of international procedural standards, fairness generally mandates a procedure providing for a reasonable chance to enforce a claim to protection. Applicants must be given an opportunity to present their claim by means of an application to asylum and to pursue it throughout the procedure. Efficiency has different connotations. From the point of view of the applicant, it means that the procedural rights and the legal status should allow them to enforce their claim within a reasonable period of time. At the same time, however, efficiency also relates to the public interest if asylum procedures are required to be swift in order to save scarce public ressources and to prevent asylum procedures from becoming a back door to illegal immigration. In sum, the concept of 'fair and efficient' procedures embraces a large discretion on the side of states within the (rather broad) international normative limits described above. 163 This background explains the great practical relevance of the Asylum Procedure Directive 2013/32/EU, which lays down detailed prescriptions for Member States and, moreover, must be interpreted in the line with the procedural human rights standards in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (see Hailbronner/ Thym, Constitutional Framework, MN 34 47).
European Convention on Human Rights 55
On the basis of the general principles guiding compliance of EU legislation with human rights (see above MN 45), three provisions of the ECHR are particularly relevant for immigration and asylum policy. While Article 8 ECHR is activated by migrants against European countries they are living in to protect their private or family life (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Law, MN 53 55), Article 3 ECHR serves as a central guarantee against mistreatment in countries of origin or transit from which European states are asked to provide shelter (see below MN 57 58), and Article 13 ECHR guides procedural and judicial decision making (see below MN 60). On this basis, the ECtHR effectively turned the European Convention into an instru ment of refugee protection, although the state parties had originally deliberately decided not to integrate a right to asylum in the ECHR. 164 In the early 1990s, the ECtHR nonetheless started to activate Article 3 ECHR as an additional instrument of refugee 161 The report was elaborated by the Committee on Refugee Procedures chaired by Kay Hailbronner and had been drafted by Guy Goodwin Gill; it is available online at http://www.ila hq.org/en/committees/ index.cfm/cid/27 [last accessed 1 November 2015] . 162 
Legal Framework for EU Asylum Policy
Part D I protection and extended it beyond the reach of the Geneva Convention. 165 The ECHR not only protects individuals against persecution, but may cover other threats to life resulting from indiscriminate violence or, in exceptional circumstances, socioeconomic living conditions in countries of origin (see below MN 57 58). In short, Article 3 ECHR has been turned into an instrument for refugee protection also in situations not covered by the Geneva Convention ratione materiae.
In contrast to the Geneva Convention, the ECHR establishes an obligatory judicial system providing for authoritative interpretation and enabling anyone to seek redress against the alleged violation of Convention rights before the ECtHR in Strasbourg. Indeed, a great number of applicants have seized the ECtHR in asylum matters in recent years, thereby stretching the institutional ressources of the Court system 166 and motivating the latter to gradually move towards an informal lead case system (see above MN 46) which exemplarily analyses the situation in specific countries of origin or transit instead of focusing on the individual case. 167 Although the EU has not yet formally acceded to the European Convention, the parallel interpretation of the EU Charter in regular circumstances guarantees a level playing field of human rights protection in Europe even if the position of the ECJ prevails over the interpretation of the ECtHR for all matters relating to EU law in a (rare) case of conflict between the two courts (see Hailbronner/Thym, Constitutional Framework, MN 51). Notwithstanding the widespread overlap of the European Convention with the Geneva Convention and the EU asylum acquis, the different sources must be distinguished doctrinally not least because the procedural means of administrative and judicial enforcement can differ. The Asylum Procedure Directive 2011/32/EU in particular covers applications for international protection only and therefore does not encompass asylum claims based on the ECHR whenever the latter extends beyond the Geneva Convention or EU style subsidiary protection (see above MN 21). 168 Over the past 25 years, the ECtHR has developed extensive criteria for limiting state discretion regarding extradition or expulsion whenever the transferee faces a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment abroad. Since the Court considers Article 3 to enshrine one of the most fundamental values of democratic society, it construes the provision as an absolute guarantee from which no derogation is possible and which can therefore also cover those who are excluded from refugee status under the exclusion provisions in the Geneva Convention. 169 The ECtHR accepts, however, that the ECHR does not stand in the way of return whenever the country of destination provides for diplomatic assurances that must include, besides abstract obligations, assurances and procedures guaranteeing for their actual implementation. 170 In contrast to EU legisla tion and the Geneva Convention, the ECHR is concerned primarily with the prevention of refoulement and does not encompass a set of guarantees regulating the legal status of asylum seekers during the asylum procedure or after recognition.
The ECtHR assumes, controversially, that living conditions abroad after expulsion may amount, even in the absence of persecution, to a violation of Article 3 ECHR if the transferee had to live in extreme poverty or will be subject to excessive cases of indiscriminate violence which is not directed against a specific social group but defines the situation in the country concerned more generally. After a series of far reaching judgments in the late 1990s, the ECtHR has adopted a more careful position in recent years by stressing that 'a general situation of violence will not normally in itself entail a violation of Article 3', since such an approach is warranted 'only in the most extreme cases.' 171 In a number of follow up rulings, it has carefully applied these standards to different countries of origin. 172 Along similar lines, the ECtHR has found that socio economic living conditions, in particular the lack of medical care, can be covered by Article 3 ECHR in 'very exceptional circumstances,' for instance if the applicant effectively faces imminent death upon return. 173 The Grand Chamber confirmed this position in a judgment of principle, because applicants 'cannot in principle claim any entitlement to remain in the territory of a Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance and services' even if the standard of living in the country of origin is much lower. 174 Against this background, it is problematic that the ECtHR has applied stricter standards to European countries regarding Dublin transfers (see above MN 29). 175 In relation to third states, the EU legislature and the ECJ adopted a somewhat critical perspective when they designed Article 15 Asylum Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU to be narrower than Article 3 ECHR (see above MN 21).
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Besides Article 3 ECHR, the ECtHR assumes that the violation of other human rights in countries of origin can also stand in the way of deportation or extradition. However, in such scenarios, it insists on a particularly strict assessment, thereby effectively establishing distinctive standards for internal and removal cases. 176 Instead of applying its case law on the human right in question to the situation in the country of origin, an approach which would result in a problematic application of the intra European human rights standards to the situation abroad, the ECtHR inquires whether we are faced with a 'flagrant denial' of other human rights a threshold which is higher than the intra European benchmark and will be met in exceptional circumstances only. In practice, it has found that extreme scenarios of unfair judicial procedures or detention can give rise to an issue under Articles 5 and 6 ECHR, 177 although these rules will usually be more relevant in extradition than in expulsion cases. For asylum matters, Article 3 ECHR remains the central yardstick. In line with more recent ECtHR case law, the ECHR can be applied extraterritorially whenever the contracting parties exercise jurisdiction over a person, in particular once he has been transferred to a European border guard vessel on the High Seas (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 38 39).
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The ECHR has gained particular relevance in procedural issues, thereby complement ing the rather general standards at international level (see above MN 52 54) with a more specific continental benchmark. Since Article 6 ECHR does not apply to immi gration and asylum cases due to their non civil and non criminal character, 178 Arti cle 13 ECHR on the right to an effective remedy has become the central yardstick. Any application of the provision requires, in contrast to Article 47 of the EU Charter (see Hailbronner/Thym, Constitutional Framework, MN 37), a prima facie case under Article 3 ECHR, i. e. applicants have to show a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment in order to avail themselves of the procedural guarantees under the Convention: Article 13 ECHR does not apply without an arguable complaint. 179 Once this condition is met, states must establish an effective remedy in relation to which the contracting parties are afforded some discretion. 180 More specifically, the ECtHR has held that the remedy must be available in practice and provide for a prompt response as well as an independent and rigorous scrutiny. 181 It also requires complaints in relation to Article 3 ECHR to have automatic suspensive effect, which effectively requires the option of a court oversight before a foreigner is returned to a third state. 182 
Other International Agreements
in the case of the rights of the child, may influence the asylum procedure. 184 Whenever these issues are relevant, they are discussed in the chapter commenting on a specific legal instrument.
Charter of Fundamental Rights 62
In accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, Articles 4, 7 and 19 EU Charter must be interpreted in line with established ECtHR case law (see above MN 56). This entails that Article 4 of the Charter should be interpreted in line with Article 3 ECHR 185 and that the limitations in Article 52(1) of the Charter cannot be applied to a human right that the ECHR considers to be absolute, such as Article 3 ECHR (see above MN 57). Guarantees for administrative and judicial proceedings under Articles 41 42, 47 of the Charter extend to asylum law and can be particularly relevant, since they reach further than the ECHR (Hailbronner/Thym, Constitutional Framework, MN 37).
